Duquesne Law Review
Volume 27

Number 2

Article 10

1989

Criminal Law - Double Jeopardy Clause - Successive Prosecutions
- Lesser Included Offense
Carol Starr

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carol Starr, Criminal Law - Double Jeopardy Clause - Successive Prosecutions - Lesser Included Offense,
27 Duq. L. Rev. 411 (1989).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol27/iss2/10

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

CRIMINAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE-SUCCESSIVE PROSECU-

INCLUDED OFFENSE-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that the double jeopardy protections of Rule
1120(d) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure applied
only to successive prosecutions and could not be invoked to bar a
retrial following a mistrial precipitated by a hung jury.
TIONS-LESSER

Commonwealth v. McCane, 517 Pa. 489, 539 A.2d 340 (1988).
On August 4, 1984, Alvie Donald McCane was arrested and
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.' Three days
later, a criminal complaint was filed, charging McCane with homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence in addition to the
offense of driving under the influence of alcohol.2 Subsequently,
the Commonwealth filed an information containing both charges
on November 29, 1984.1 McCane waived arraignment and a jury
trial commenced on April 22, 1985, in the Court of Common Pleas
of Lackawanna County.4 The jury returned a guilty verdict on the
driving under the influence charge, but was unable to reach a ver1. Brief for McCane at 3. Commonwealth v. McCane, 517 Pa. 489, 492, 539 A.2d 340,
342 (1988). Driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance [hereinafter
driving under the influence] is a violation of § 3731 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Code. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Purdon Supp. 1988). Section 3731 states, in pertinent
part:
a) Offense defined.-A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control
of the movement of any vehicle while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of
safe driving;
2) under the influence of any controlled substance ... to a degree which renders the
person incapable of safe driving;
(3) under the combined influence of alcohol and any controlled substance to a degree
which renders the person incapable of safe driving; or
(4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is 0.10% or greater.
Id.
2. Brief for McCane at 3. Homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence is a
violation of § 3735 of the Motor Vehicle Code. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (Purdon
Supp. 1988). The operative language of § 3735 is as follows:
a) Offense defined.-Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person as the direct result of a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) and who is convicted of violating section 3731
is guilty of a felony of the third degree when the violation is the cause of death. ..
Id.
3. Brief for McCane at 3.
4. Id.
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dict on the homicide by vehicle charge. 5 The guilty verdict was entered against McCane on the driving under the influence charge;
however, a mistrial was declared with respect to the charge of
homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence.'
Thereafter, the district attorney scheduled the retrial of McCane
on the charge of homicide by vehicle. 7 Upon learning of the prosecutor's attempt to retry the case, McCane moved to quash the information and to dismiss the homicide by vehicle charge.8 In support of these motions, McCane argued that Rule 1120(d) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,9 section 109 of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code'0 and the double jeopardy clauses of
the Pennsylvania 1 and United States Constitutions 2 barred his
reprosecution on the charge of homicide by vehicle while driving
under the influence because he was previously tried and convicted
of driving while under the influence, a lesser included offense.' s
McCane argued that driving under the influence is an included of5. McCane, 517 Pa. at 492, 539 A.2d at 342.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Rule 1120(d) provides:
If there are two or more counts in the information or indictment, the jury may report
a verdict or verdicts with respect to those counts upon which it was agreed, and the
judge shall receive and record all such verdicts. If the jury cannot agree with respect
to all the counts in the information or indictment if those counts to which it has
agreed operate as an acquittal of lesser or greater included offenses to which they
cannot agree, these latter counts shall be dismissed. When the counts in the information or indictment upon which the jury cannot agree are not included offenses of the
counts in the information or indictment upon which it has agreed, the defendant or
defendants may be retried on those counts in the information or indictment.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 1120(d).
10. Section 109 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states, in pertinent part:
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the statutes and is
based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal. There is an acquittal if the
prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding
of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive
offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 109(1) (Purdon 1983).
11. The double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads, in pertinent
part, as follows: "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .. " Pa. CONST. art. I, cl.10.
12. The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution is set forth in the
fifth amendment as follows: "[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. McCane, 517 Pa. at 493-94, 539 A.2d at 342.

1989

Recent Decision

fense of the crime of homicide by vehicle while driving under the
influence, and his conviction of the lesser included offense pre4
cludes reprosecution on the greater included offense.'
Subsequent to oral argument on McCane's motions to quash and
to dismiss the information, the trial court disposed of McCane's
motions on the basis of Rule 1120(d) alone, holding that Rule
1120(d) barred further prosecution of McCane.15 The trial court's
decision turned on whether homicide by vehicle while driving
under the influence is a greater included offense"6 of driving under
the influence.' 7 Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the offenses of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence and
driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance are
"included offenses"' 8 for purposes of Rule 1120(d).' 9 Consequently,
the trial court held that reprosecution of McCane was prohibited
14. Id. at 495, 539 A.2d at 343-44. In Pennsylvania, the test for determining whether
an offense is a lesser included offense is whether the greater offense "necessarily involves"
the lesser offense. See Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynski v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 104, 21 A.2d
920, 921 (1941); Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 239 Pa. Super. 187, 191, 361 A.2d 746, 748
(1976). One offense necessarily involves another when all of the essential elements of the
lesser offense are included in the greater offense. See Commonwealth v. Wood, 327 Pa.
Super. 351, 353, 475 A.2d 834, 835 (1984); Ackerman, 239 Pa. Super. at 192, 361 A.2d at 748.
For a thorough discussion of the lesser included offense doctrine in Pennsylvania, see Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Pennsylvania: Uncertainty in the Courts,
84 DICK. L. REV. 125 (1979).
15. McCane, 517 Pa. at 493, 539 A.2d at 343-44.
16. See supra note 13. See also infra note 19.
17. Commonwealth v. McCane, No. 84 Cr. 767, slip op. at 3 (C.P.Ct. Lackawanna Co.,
Oct. 2, 1985) [hereinafter McCane slip op.].
18. An included offense is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows: "Included offense. In criminal law, a crime which is part of another crime;. . . . To be an 'included
offense,' all elements of the lesser offense must be contained in the greater offense, the
greater containing certain elements not contained in the lesser." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
689 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted).
19. McCane slip op. at 5. In concluding that homicide by vehicle while driving under
the influence is a greater included offense, the trial court relied on the test propounded in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) and adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Pounds, 281 Pa. Super. 19, 421 A.2d 1126 (1980). McCane
slip op. at 4. Under this test, two offenses are "included" for double jeopardy purposes if the
same act or transaction gives rise to a violation of two distinct statutory provisions and
neither offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Id. at 3-4 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304). Applying this test to the statutory provisions violated in McCane,
the trial court opined that homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence always
necessitates proof of driving under the influence, and thus, the two offense are the "same"
for the purpose of invoking the protection of the double jeopardy clause. McCane slip op. at
6. The majority in McCane, however, did not apply the Blockburger test; rather, they considered the test propounded in Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynski v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 21
A.2d 920 (1941). For a full explanation of the test employed in Moszczynski, see infra text
accompanying notes 125-133.
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by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1120(d).20
A timely appeal was taken by the Commonwealth to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.2 1 In a memorandum opinion, a three
judge panel of the superior court adopted the opinion of the trial
court and affirmed the order dismissing the charge of homicide by
vehicle.22
The Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal with
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was granted.2 3 In a 6-0
decision, the supreme court reversed the order of the superior
court and remanded the case to the court of common pleas for retrial.24 McCane then filed an Application for Reargument which
was subsequently denied.26
Justice Larsen, who delivered the opinion for the majority,2 6
looked first to the operative language of Rule 1120(d). 2 7 The court
also examined the comment to Rule 1120,28 the purpose of Rule
1120(d) 29 and the pertinent case law.30 Based upon Justice Larsen's
analysis, the court concluded that Rule 1120(d) only applied to
''successive prosecutions," and not to a retrial following a mistrial
caused by a deadlocked jury." Since the Commonwealth was at20. McCane slip op. at 5.
21. McCane, 517 Pa. at 492, 539 A.2d at 342.
22. Commonwealth v. McCane, 359 Pa. Super. 608, 515 A.2d 618 (1986). The three
judge panel of the superior court was comprised of Judges Beck, Popovich and Hoffman. Id.
23. 515 Pa. 575, 527 A.2d 537 (1987).
24. McCane, 517 Pa. at 501, 539 A.2d at 346.
25. Commonwealth v. McCane, 517 Pa. 489, 539 A.2d 340 (1988).
26. Justice Larsen's majority opinion was joined by Justices Flaherty, McDermott,
Zappala and Papadakos. Chief Justice Nix filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 490-91, 539
A.2d at 341-42.
27. Id. at 493, 539 A.2d at 342. The court found the following language of Rule 1120(d)
to be pivotal in resolving the question of whether McCane's conviction of driving under the
influence of alcohol had the effect of an acquittal on the homicide by vehicle charge: "If the
jury cannot agree with respect to all the counts in the information or indictment ifthose
counts to which it has agreed operate as an acquittalof lesser or greater included offenses
to which they cannot agree, these latter counts shall be dismissed .... " Id. at 493, 539
A.2d at 342-43 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 497, 539 A.2d at 344. The comment to Rule 1120 provides that: "Sections
(c), (d) and (e) serve only to codify the procedure where conviction or acquittal of one offense operates as a bar to a later trial on a necessarily included offense.
PA. R. CRIM. P.
1120.
29. The court found that the purpose of Rule 1120(d) is to prevent successive prosecutions which violate double jeopardy. McCane, 517 Pa. at 497, 539 A.2d at 344.
30. See infra notes 84 and 101 and accompanying text.
31. McCane, 517 Pa. at 497, 539 A.2d at 344. Successive prosecution is explained in
the introductory paragraph of § 109 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code as follows: "When a
prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the statutes and is based upon the
same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by such former prosecution under the follow-
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tempting to reprosecute McCane on the charge of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence after a mistrial precipitated
by a hung jury, the supreme court held that Rule 1120(d) did not
preclude reprosecution of McCane. s2
In reaching its holding, the supreme court rejected McCane's argument that reprosecution is precluded because driving under the
influence is a lesser included offense of homicide by vehicle while
driving under the influence. 33 Specifically, McCane argued that
since section 3735 required a conviction of a particular specified
offense, driving under the influence, in order to convict a person of
homicide by vehicle, 4 driving under the influence was an included
3 5
offense of homicide by vehicle, and therefore, retrial was barred.
McCane attempted to distinguish the superior court's holding in
Commonwealth v. Pounds3 6 by contrasting the expressed and implied language of the homicide by vehicle statutes at issue in
37
Pounds with those in the instant case.
In Pounds, Judge Van der Voort found that a conviction of vehicular homicide did not imply a finding of guilt as to any particular offense under section 3732. Consequently, the motor vehicle offenses at issue in Pounds were not deemed "included offenses" of
homicide by vehicle for double jeopardy purposes.3 8 In response to
McCane's argument, the supreme court stated, in a conclusory
fashion, that retrial was not precluded, even though a conviction of
section 3731 was required under section 3735.19 Justice Larsen appeared to intimate that even if driving under the influence was a
lesser included offense of the vehicular homicide charge, reprosecution following a mistrial caused by a hung jury would not be precluded since such "retrial" did not constitute a "successive
ing circumstances ..

" 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 109 (Purdon 1983).
32. McCane, 517 Pa. at 497, 539 A.2d at 344.
33. Id. at 495, 539 A.2d at 344.
34. For a definition of homicide by vehicle, see supra note 2.
35. McCane, 517 Pa. at 495, 539 A.2d at 343-44.
36. 281 Pa. Super. 19, 421 A.2d 1126 (1980), petition for allowance of appeal denied.
For a discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 101-108.
37. 517 Pa. at 495, 539 A.2d at 343-44. The statute violated in Pounds, 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon Supp. 1988), did not require a violation of a particular motor
vehicle law as a condition of imposing guilt for homicide by vehicle, whereas the statute
involved in McCane, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (Purdon Supp. 1988), requires a violation of § 3731. For a complete definition of these offenses, see supra notes 1-2 and infra
note 86.
38. Pounds, 281 Pa. Super. at 26, 421 A.2d at 1129.
39. McCane, 517 Pa. at 495, 539 A.2d at 344.

416

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:411

prosecution. ' 04
Next, the supreme court considered the Commonwealth's argument that reprosecution of McCane on the charge of homicide by
vehicle while driving under the influence was not prohibited by
section 109 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. 41 The supreme court
agreed with the Commonwealth and similarly interpreted section
109 to bar only successive prosecutions.42 Because the Commonwealth's reprosecution of McCane involved a retrial following a
mistrial, and not successive prosecutions, Justice Larsen concluded
that section 109 was inapplicable here.43 The corollary drawn by
44
the supreme court in reliance upon Commonwealth v. Vincent
was that since section 109 was inapplicable, there could be no acquittal on the greater included offense of homicide by vehicle while
driving under the influence.4 5
The supreme court then engaged in a discussion of under what
circumstances one offense would be included in another. 46 The
court distinguished the offenses of driving under the influence and
40. Id. at 498, 539 A.2d at 345.
41. Id. at 497, 539 A.2d at 344. For a full discussion of § 109, see supra note 10. Although the trial court did not reach this issue in deciding McCane's motions to quash and to
dismiss the information, McCane raised the question in his motions before the trial court of
whether § 109 operated to bar his reprosecution on the homicide by vehicle charge. McCane
slip op. at 2.
42. McCane, 517 Pa. at 498, 539 A.2d at 345. Justice Larsen looked to the introductory
paragraph of § 109 to ascertain when reprosecution is barred under that section. See supra
note 31.
43. McCane, 517 Pa. at 498, 539 A.2d at 345.
44. 345 Pa. Super. 173, 497 A.2d 1360 (1985). In Vincent, the superior court was asked
to consider whether retrial was barred by double jeopardy considerations where a defendant
was convicted of a specified traffic offense, but the jury could not reach a decision on a
related homicide by vehicle charge. Id. at 174, 497 A.2d 1360. The superior court ruled that
"section 109 applies only to successive prosecutions, not to the distinct problem of retrial
following a deadlocked jury." Id. at 176, 497 A.2d at 1362 (footnote omitted). Looking at the
specific facts in Vincent, the superior court found that there was no attempt at successive
prosecutions because the vehicular homicide charge and the underlying traffic offenses were
prosecuted in the same proceeding. Id. Thus, the superior court concluded that § 109 did
not provide a statutory basis for invoking the protection of the double jeopardy clause. Id.
For a thorough discussion of the superior court's opinion in Vincent, see infra text accompanying notes 84-100.
45. McCane, 517 Pa. at 498, 539 A.2d at 345. The Commonwealth argued in- its brief
that McCane's conviction on the driving under the influence charge did not act as an acquittal of the homicide by vehicle charge since the latter offense required proof of an additional
fact, namely, that McCane's driving while under the influence of alcohol caused the victim's
death. Brief for Commonwealth at 9.
46. McCane, 517 Pa. at 498-99, 539 A.2d at 345. The court stated the test to be
"whether the greater offense necessarily involves the lesser." Id. The court cited several
examples, such as a conviction of robbery necessarily includes the crime of larceny, and a
conviction of murder necessarily includes assault and battery. Id.
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homicide by vehicle from two greater offenses that necessarily include lesser offenses: robbery, which necessarily includes the crime
of larceny, and murder, which necessarily contains the offenses of
assault and battery.4 7
Initially, the court acknowledged that, inasmuch as section 3735
requires that the accused be convicted of driving under the influence as a prerequisite to a conviction under that section, driving
under the influence of alcohol is an included offense of homicide by
vehicle while driving under the influence."' However, Justice Larsen was quick to note that the two statutory violations were not
included offenses in the same sense as larceny is included in robbery, and as assault and battery is included in murder.49 The court
explained that unlike section 3735, a conviction of robbery does
not require that the accused be found guilty of larceny and that
the said act caused the loss as a prerequisite to assessing guilt for
robbery.5 0 The same analogy was drawn by the court between assault and battery and murder.5 1
A further distinction made by the McCane court was that the
offense of driving under the influence sought to protect a different
interest than that to be protected by the homicide by vehicle statute.52 Based on its analysis of the lesser included offense doctrine,
the supreme court concluded that the offense of driving under the
influence was not a lesser included offense of the crime of homicide
by vehicle while driving under the influence. 3
Justice Larsen also addressed the Commonwealth's argument
that the double jeopardy clauses of the Pennsylvania and United
States Constitutions do not preclude the retrial of McCane.5 4 Rely47. Id. The homicide by vehicle statute requires that the accused be convicted of driving under the influence before he can be found guilty of homicide by vehicle. See 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (Purdon Supp. 1988). For a full text of § 3735, see supra note 2. In
contrast, larceny or assault and battery do not have to be proven as a prerequisite to convicting a criminal defendant of robbery or murder, respectively. McCane, 517 Pa. at 498-99,
539 A.2d at 345.
48. McCane, 517 Pa. at 498, 539 A.2d at 345.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 498-99, 539 A.2d at 345.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 499, 539 A.2d at 345. Homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence
involves victims whose lives the statute seeks to protect, while the offense of driving under
the influence, according to the court, is a victimless crime, the main purpose of which is to
keep the highways free from the dangers presented by intoxicated drivers. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. For the pertinent text of the constitutional provisions, see supra notes 11 and
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ing on firmly embedded precedent, 55 Justice Larsen stated that the
protection of the double jeopardy clause may only be invoked
against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after a conviction or an acquittal, or against multiple punishments for the
same crime. 56 As a general rule, the court stated that a mistrial
precipitated by a deadlocked jury does not fall within these protections.5 7 Because McCane was tried for both offenses in the same
proceeding, Justice Larsen determined that the retrial of McCane
would not involve a successive prosecution.58
In support of this holding, Justice Larsen reiterated his previous
thesis that successive prosecutions are required before the protections of the double jeopardy clause can be applied.5 9 Inasmuch as
the retrial of McCane did not constitute a successive prosecution,
McCane could not invoke the protection of the double jeopardy
clause. 0 Thus, the court concluded that double jeopardy would not
be violated by the reprosecution of McCane on the homicide by
vehicle charge.6 In reaching this conclusion, the court also gave
consideration to important public policies aimed at protecting society from those individuals guilty of crimes, and at preventing insurmountable obstacles from blocking the administration of
justice.2
Finally, in reaching the conclusion that the defendant had not
raised a valid constitutional double jeopardy claim, the majority in
McCane relied on Richardson v. United States.6 Based on Rich55. See infra notes 159, 164, 169 and 176 and accompanying text.
56. McCane, 517 Pa. at 499, 539 A.2d at 346.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 500, 539 A.2d at 346.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 500-01, 539 A.2d at 346. Without citing any authority, the majority in McCane noted that the double jeopardy provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution involved
the same meaning, purpose, and end. Id. at 500 n.5, 539 A.2d at 346 n.5.
62. Id. at 500, 539 A.2d at 346. The court considered various policy arguments articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). In
Wade, the Supreme Court suggested that a rule allowing a defendant to go free whenever
the trial fails to end in a final judgment would create havoc in the administration of justice
in cases where there are no double jeopardy violations. Id. at 688-89. In the instance where
the jury failed to reach a verdict, the Supreme Court felt that prohibiting retrial of the
defendant would frustrate the purpose of the law to protect society from those guilty of
crimes. Id. at 689. Weighing the various interests at issue, the Wade court concluded that,
in some circumstances, society's interest in obtaining fair trials resulting in just judgments
outweighs an accused's right to have his trial decided by a particular tribunal. Id.
63. 468 U.S. 317 (1984). In Richardson, the Supreme Court held that retrial following
a hung jury does not violate double jeopardy principles. Id. at 324. For a thorough discussion of this case, see infra notes 176-183 and accompanying text.
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ardson, the McCane court concluded that the jury's failure to
reach a verdict on the charge of homicide by vehicle while driving
under the influence was not an event that terminated jeopardy."
Accordingly, the court in the instant case held that a retrial of Mc5
Cane was not barred by double jeopardy principles.
Chief Justice Nix filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed
with the result reached by the majority to allow the reprosecution
of McCane on the vehicular homicide charge. 6 However, the Chief
Justice parted ways with the majority in two respects. First, Chief
Justice Nix disagreed with the majority's analysis of the Rule
1120(d) argument."" Specifically, the Chief Justice rejected the reasoning employed by the majority in reaching the conclusion that
driving under the influence of alcohol is not a lesser included offense of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence.6 8 In
fact, Chief Justice Nix agreed with the trial court that driving
under the influence and homicide by vehicle while driving under
the influence are included offenses.6 9
Notwithstanding this finding, the Chief Justice still concluded
that there was no acquittal of the vehicular homicide charge for
purposes of Rule 1120(d). 70 In support of his conclusion, Chief Justice Nix stated that the trial court misapplied section 109 of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code. 1 In this regard, the trial court read
Rule 1120(d) and section 109 in tandem and dismissed the deadlocked charge of vehicular homicide because the trial judge found
that driving under the influence was clearly a lesser included offense of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence.7 2
64. McCane, 517 Pa. at 500, 539 A.2d at 346. A criminal defendant in a jury trial is
first put in jeopardy when the jury is empaneled. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325. Jeopardy for
that offense continues until the jury renders a verdict. Id. Thus, when the jury fails to reach
a verdict, the original jeopardy never ends and continues for purposes of retrial. Id. See also
S. SINGER & M. HARTMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK §§ 16.1-.23
(1986).
65. McCane, 517 Pa. at 500-01, 539 A.2d at 346.
66. Id. at 501, 539 A.2d at 346.
67. Id. at 501-02, 539 A.2d at 346-47.
68. Id. The Chief Justice referred to the majority's analysis as convoluted. Id. Chief
Justice Nix further noted that the majority seemed to be implying that the lesser included
offense doctrine was confined to common law offenses and did not encompass statutory offenses. Id. at 501 n.1, 539 A.2d at 347 n.1.
69. Id. at 501, 539 A.2d at 347.
70. Id. at 502, 539 A.2d at 347.
71. Id. at 501-02, 539 A.2d at 347.
72. Id. at 501, 539 A.2d at 346. The concurrence found that the trial court was motivated to dismiss the greater offense against McCane by erroneously interpreting § 109 to
mean a conviction of the lesser offense operated as an acquittal of the greater offense, even
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Chief Justice Nix, on the other hand, construed section 109 to
apply only where the sole offense charged in the information or
indictment was the greater offense and the jury returned a guilty
verdict on the lesser included offense. 73 The Chief Justice explained that section 109 was never intended to apply where a defendant has been charged in the same proceeding with two separate offenses, both of which are included offenses, but is convicted
of only one offense.7 4 Chief Justice Nix concluded that the commonwealth was free to reprosecute McCane on the vehicular homicide charge as there was no acquittal as defined under Rule
1120(d).7
The concurrence also disagreed with the majority's decision to
7
consider the constitutional claim raised by McCanes.
The Chief
Justice commented briefly that since the trial court resolved the
defendant's petition to quash the information solely on the basis of
Rule 1120(d) and section 109, the majority should have abstained
from deciding McCane's constitutional double jeopardy claim. 7
Chief Justice Nix would have reversed the decision of the superior
court on nonconstitutional grounds only.78
The starting point for the McCane court's analysis was an examination of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1120(d). 7s
Promulgated just twenty years ago,80 Rule 1120 was enacted to
prevent successive prosecutions in violation of the double jeopardy
clause. 8 ' In particular, the plain meaning of that portion of Rule
1120(d) relied on by the trial court and McCane82 suggests that
double jeopardy is activated to bar only successive prosecutions.83
though both charges were brought in the same proceeding. Id.
73. Id. at 502, 539 A.2d at 347.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 502-03, 539 A.2d at 347.
77. Id. The Chief Justice noted that established jurisprudence in Pennsylvania required the supreme court to limit their consideration to those issues properly before it. Id.
In the Chief Justice's opinion, the constitutional issue raised by McCane was not properly
before the supreme court. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 493, 539 A.2d at 342-43.
80. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1120 was adopted Jan. 24, 1968, effective Aug. 1, 1968; amended
Feb. 13, 1974, effective immediately.
81. McCane, 517 Pa. at 497, 539 A.2d at 344.
82. See supra note 27.
83. 517 Pa. at 497, 539 A.2d at 344. See also Commonwealth v. Jones, 274 Pa. Super.
162, 418 A.2d 346 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876 (1980). In Jones, the superior court held
that double jeopardy only precludes successive prosecutions. 274 Pa. Super. at 170, 418 A.2d
at 350. The court went on to explain that successive prosecution occurs where there is a
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In concluding that Rule 1120(d) did not bar the retrial of McCane on the homicide by vehicle charge, the McCane court relied
heavily upon the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Vincent. 4 In that case, the superior court was asked
to consider whether a retrial was barred by double jeopardy considerations where a defendant was convicted of a specified traffic
offense, but the jury could not reach a decision on a related homicide by vehicle charge. 5 The defendant in Vincent was charged
with two counts of vehicular homicide,88 as well as two summary
traffic offenses, 87 and was tried on all four counts in the same proceeding.88 The trial court found the defendant guilty of both traffic
offenses, but the jury was deadlocked on the two homicide by vehicle counts.8 e Thereafter, the defendant moved to dismiss the vehicular homicide charges, arguing that the traffic offenses for which he
had been adjudicated guilty were lesser included offenses of homicide by vehicle.90 The defendant in Vincent contended that retrial
second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction or acquittal. Id. Thus, the Jones
court concluded that where all the charges are brought against a defendant in one proceeding, and a mistrial is declared on one of the charges as a result of a hung jury, this situation
is not the same as a successive prosecution. Id. Retrial on the deadlocked charge is not
precluded. Id.
84. 345 Pa. Super. 173, 497 A.2d 1360 (1985).
85. Id. at 174, 497 A.2d 1360.
86. Id. The defendant in Vincent was charged with violating 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3732 (Purdon Supp. 1988), which states:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in
the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to
the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3731
(relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of
homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the
cause of death.
Id.
87. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 174, 497 A.2d 1360. The defendant was charged with
reckless driving, a violation of 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3714 (Purdon 1977) and with failure to drive on the right side of the roadway, a violation of 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301
(Purdon 1977).
88. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 174, 497 A.2d 1360.
89. Id.
90. Id. The defendant in Vincent attempted to distinguish his case from Commonwealth v. Pounds, 281 Pa. Super. 19, 421 A.2d 1126 (1980), on the basis that the Commonwealth used a bill of particulars to specify the underlying motor vehicle offenses for the two
vehicular homicide charges. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 175-76, 497 A.2d at 1361. See supra
text accompanying notes 34-35, 37-38. Where a bill of particulars is used, the prosecution is
required to establish homicide by vehicle in the manner set forth in the bill. Vincent, 345
Pa. Super. at 176, 497 A.2d at 1361. In this instance, then, the Commonwealth could not
establish guilt on the vehicular homicide charge without first proving defendant's guilt on
the underlying motor vehicle offenses. Id. Thus, the defendant in Vincent argued that
Pounds was inapposite and the underlying motor vehicle offenses were lesser included of-
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on the two counts of vehicular homicide would violate the double
jeopardy clause. 1
The trial court in Vincent rejected the defendant's double jeopardy claim, and the superior court affirmed the decision.9 2 Taking
into account the specific facts before it, the superior court determined that a retrial following a mistrial does not provide either a
statutory or constitutional basis for invoking the protection of the
double jeopardy clause.9 3 As to the defendant's constitutional
claim, the court found that it was unnecessary to consider whether
the underlying motor vehicle offenses were lesser included offenses
of vehicular homicide because there was no attempt at successive
prosecutions. 4 The defendant cited Illinois v. Vitale 95 and Brown
v. Ohio9 in support of the lesser included offense argument, but
the superior court distinguished both cases on the basis that they
dealt with successive prosecutions and not a retrial following a
mistrial precipitated by a hung jury.
After discussing the substantive elements of the defendant's
Rule 1120(d) claim, the superior court in Vincent also noted that
fenses for double jeopardy purposes under Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980). Vincent,
345 Pa. Super. at 176, 497 A.2d at 1361. See infra note 95.
91. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 174, 497 A.2d 1360.
92. Id. The trial court in Vincent relied on Commonwealth v. Pounds, 281 Pa. Super.
19, 421 A.2d 1126 (1980). Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 175, 497 A.2d 1360. For a full discussion of Pounds, see infra text accompanying notes 101-108.
93. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 175-76, 497 A.2d at 1361-62. For a discussion of the
statutory double jeopardy claim, see infra text accompanying notes 109-123.
94. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 176, 497 A.2d at 1361.
95. 447 U.S. 410 (1980). In Vitale, the defendant had been charged with failing to
reduce his speed to avoid a collision, to which he pled guilty. Id. at 412-13. In a subsequent
proceeding, the state attempted to prosecute the defendant for involuntary manslaughter
based on the same incident. Id. The Supreme Court held that if involuntary manslaughter is
a greater inclusive offense of failing to reduce speed, then double jeopardy would prohibit
the second prosecution, for the reason that there would then be successive prosecutions for
the same offense. Id. at 421.
96. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). In Brown, the Supreme Court held that a conviction for a
lesser included offense bars later prosecution for the greater offense. Id. at 169. In this case,
the defendant was charged with joy riding to which he pled guilty. Id. at 162. The defendant
was later indicted for auto theft. Id. at 162-63. The Supreme Court concluded that since the
joy riding offense required no proof beyond that which was required for a conviction of auto
theft, the two charges were the same offense within the meaning of the double jeopardy
clause, and therefore, barred the second prosecution. Id. at 168.
97. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 176-77, 497 A.2d at 1361-62. Both Vitale and Brown
were distinguished by the superior court in Vincent on the basis that the lesser offense was
not brought in the same proceeding as the greater inclusive offense. Id. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court had noted in Brown that they were not concerned with the situation
where a defendant is reprosecuted on the same charge after a mistrial. Brown, 432 U.S. at
165 n.5.
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the defendant could not use the double jeopardy protections of
Rule 1120 to make a claim independent of substantive constitutional and statutory double jeopardy claims.9 8 In arriving at this
conclusion, the court found the comment to Rule 1120" to be instructive, as the comment clearly indicated that subsections (c),
(d) and (e) merely codified the procedure to be followed when a
substantive double jeopardy claim had been established. 0 0
Another superior court case given considerable weight in both
McCane and Vincent was Commonwealth v. Pounds.'' The issue
raised in Pounds was whether homicide by vehicle was a greater
included offense of driving under the influence of alcohol or driving to the left of the center line, such that a conviction on either
one of the lesser two offenses would bar a retrial on the greater
offense. 102 The defendant in Pounds was found guilty of driving to
the left of the center line by the trial court. 10 3 At the same trial,
the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge of driving under
the influence of alcohol, 04 but was unable to reach a decision as to
the vehicular homicide charge. 0 5 The Commonwealth attempted
to retry the defendant on the vehicular homicide charge, but the
98. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 178, 497 A.2d at 1362. The superior court's statement
was made with regard to Rule 1120(e). Id. However, Rules 1120(e) and 1120(d) are essentially the same with the former rule applying to cases involving two or more informations,
and the latter applying when there are two or more counts in the same information. PA. R.
CRIM. P. 1120(d) and 1120(e). In addition, the comment following Rule 1120 applies to both
subsections (d) and (e). Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 178, 497 A.2d at 1362. See supra note 29
for a text of the comment.
99. For a full text of the comment to Rule 1120, see supra note 29.
100. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 178, 497 A.2d at 1362.
101. 281 Pa. Super. 19, 421 A.2d 1126 (1980), petition for allowance of appeal denied.
Pounds was argued before a three judge panel of the superior court consisting of Judges Van
der Voort, Spaeth, and Hoffman. Id. at 21, 421 A.2d 1126. Although Judges Spaeth and
Hoffman concurred only in the result, the superior court in Vincent considered Pounds to
be binding since all three judges had concurred in the result. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 175,
497 A.2d at 1361.
102. Pounds, 281 Pa. Super. at 24, 421 A.2d at 1128.
103. Id. at 21, 421 A.2d 1126.
104. Id. For a definition of driving under the influence of alcohol, see supra note 1.
105. Pounds, 281 Pa. Super. at 21, 421 A.2d 1126. The superior court noted that the
jury was apparently unable to determine whether the defendant's motor vehicle violations
were the cause of the victim's death. Id. at 21, 421 A.2d at 1127.
The vehicular homicide statute that defendant was charged with violating is codified at 75
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977) and provides:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in
the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to
the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic is guilty of homicide by
vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
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defendant filed a petition to quash the indictment,"'6 alleging inter
alia that the motor vehicle offenses for which he was convicted
were lesser included offenses of homicide by vehicle, and thus, operated as an acquittal of the greater offense. 10 7 The superior court
ruled that the defendant's convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and driving to the left of center did not imply an
acquittal on the vehicular homicide charge, reasoning that homicide by vehicle required proof of an additional fact, namely, that
the violations of the traffic offenses caused the victim's death.1 08
In keeping with the holding in Vincent that a substantive double
jeopardy claim must be established separate and apart from Rule
1120(d), 10 9 a review of the statutory double jeopardy charge under
section 109 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code is mandated. Since
1973, the application of double jeopardy to bar a second prosecution has been codified by statute in the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code.1 10 Section 109,111 which sets forth the circumstances under
which a second prosecution is barred by a former prosecution for
the same offense, was derived from section 1.08 of the MODEL PENAL CODE."' The annotation to the Pennsylvania Crimes Code Annotated,11 3 which has incorporated the MODEL PENAL CODE comments from Tentative Draft No. 5, implies that section 109 applies
only to successive prosecutions, and not to the distinct problem of
retrial necessitated by a hung jury.11 The Official Draft of the
MODEL PENAL CODE, which was released in 1962, expressly affirmed
the implication derived from the Tentative Draft in section 1.08.111
106. Pounds, 281 Pa. Super. at 21, 421 A.2d at 1126.
107. Id. at 24, 421 A.2d at 1127.
108. Id. at 26, 421 A.2d at 1129.
109. Commonwealth v. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. 173, 178, 497 A.2d 1360, 1362 (1985).
110. See Belsky, Dougherty and Goldblatt, Three ProsecutorsLook at the New Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 793, 804 (1974) [hereinafter Belsky].
111. For a full text of § 109, see supra note 10.
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08 (Official Draft 1962). See also Belsky, supra note 110,
at 804 n.82.
113.

S.

TOLL, PENNSYLVANIA

CRIMES CODE ANNOTATED

(1974).

114. Id. at 41. The comment to § 1.09(1) of the MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft
No. 5, was directed to the situation where either party appeals and obtains a reversal of the
conviction for the lesser included offense and upon reprosecution the commonwealth again
charges the defendant with the greater offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09 comment (Tent.
Draft. No. 5, 1956). Section 1.09 of the MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 5, was
renumbered as § 1.08 in the Official Draft. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08, n. at 136 (Official
Draft 1962).
115. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4)(b)(iv) (Official Draft 1962). Section 1.08
(4)(b)(iv) provides that a former prosecution will bar a subsequent prosecution when "[t]he
former prosecution was improperly terminated .... Termination under any of the following
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The expressed and implied premise of section 1.08 of the
PENAL CODE

425
MODEL

and the comments thereto was cited with approval in

Commonwealth v. Vincent.11 6
Following a basic canon of statutory construction, the superior
court in Vincent held that the third sentence of subsection
109(1)," upon which the criminal defendant based his double
jeopardy argument, must be construed in light of the introductory
paragraph" 8 to that section. 1 9 In so doing, the superior court
found that the prefatory clause clearly indicated that all of section
109 applied only to successive prosecutions. 2 0 As the problem in
Vincent involved a retrial following a mistrial precipitated by a
hung jury, and not successive prosecutions, the superior court held
that the defendant had no valid statutory double jeopardy claim
under section 109.21 In reaching this conclusion, the court assumed that the defendant was correct in claiming that the traffic
violations were lesser included offenses of homicide by vehicle. 2
The Vincent court commented that any other interpretation of
section 109 would lead to the ludicrous conclusion that a defendant would have to be acquitted of the greater offense even though
the factfinder found him guilty of that offense, so long as the trier
23
of fact also convicted him of the lesser included offense.
The majority opinion in McCane also discussed the lesser included offense doctrine in Pennsylvania.'2 4 The test for determining whether one offense is included in another was first articulated
in Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynski v. Ashe.1 5 Under this standard, one offense is included in another when the greater offense
necessarily involves the lesser offense.' 2 6 One offense necessarily incircumstances is not improper: .... (b) The trial court finds that the termination is necessary because: .... (iv) the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; .... Id.
116. Commonwealth v. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. 173, 177, 497 A.2d 1360, 1362 (1985).
117. For a full text of section 109, see supra note 10.
118. See supra note 30.
119. Vincent, 345 Pa. Super. at 177, 497 A.2d at 1362.
120. Id.
121. Id. The precise holding of the superior court in Vincent stated: "Like all subdivisions of section 109, however, this sentence must be read in the context of the introductory
paragraph, which makes it clear that all of section 109 applies only to successive prosecutions, not to the distinct problem of retrial following a deadlocked jury." Id. (footnotes and
citation omitted).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Commonwealth v. McCane, 517 Pa. 489, 498, 539 A.2d 340, 345 (1988).
125. 343 Pa. 102, 21 A.2d 920 (1941). The Moszczynski test is also applied to questions
of merger. McCane, 517 Pa. at 498, 539 A.2d at 345.
126. Moszczynski, 343 Pa. at 104, 21 A.2d at 921.
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volves another when all of the essential elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense.' 2 7
The issue in Moszczynski involved the applicability of the
merger doctrine. 2 " In that case, the defendant was charged with
three separate crimes 129 arising out of an attempted bank robbery. 30 The defendant argued that since all three crimes were part
of the same continuous, unbroken transaction, he could only be
sentenced on the most serious charge.' 3 ' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Moszczynski held that whether a single act or series of acts constitutes two or more separate offenses is determined
2
by whether each offense requires proof of some additional fact.1
Since any one of the three crimes charged could have been committed without any of the others being committed, the supreme
court upheld separate sentences for burglary, robbery, and felonious intent to kill.'
Another aspect of the lesser included offense doctrine considered
by the McCane court was whether the lesser and greater offenses
sought to protect different interests. 3 4 In support of its position,
the supreme court cited two cases dealing with the merger doctrine, Commonwealth v. Sayko'3 5 and Commonwealth v. Rhodes.'
127. Commonwealth v. Wood, 327 Pa. Super. 351, 353, 475 A.2d 834, 835 (1984). (Citations omitted). For a full discussion of the lesser included offense doctrine, see supra note
14.
128. Moszczynski, 343 Pa. at 104, 21 A.2d at 921. The doctrine of merger evolved from
the common law. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 344 Pa. Super. 108, 146, 496 A.2d 31, 51
(1985). When the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment was made applicable to the
states, it only applied to capital offenses. Id. at 146, 496 A.2d at 51. Thus, the Pennsylvania
courts constructed the merger doctrine to safeguard against multiple punishments for noncapital offenses. Id. at 146, 496 A.2d at 52.
129. Moszczynski, 343 Pa. at 103, 21 A.2d at 921. The defendant was charged with (1)
breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, (2) bank robbery and larceny, and (3)
felonious attempt to kill. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 104, 21 A.2d at 921.
132. Id. at 106, 21 A.2d at 922. The supreme court in Moszczynski commented that
"[in Commonwealth v. Mentzer, 162 Pa. 646, 29 A. 720, this court held that two offenses
may be distinct in point of law, even though they grow out of the same transaction if one
embraces a different element than the other.
... Id. (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 105, 21.A.2d at 921.
134. Commonwealth v. McCane, 517 Pa. 489, 499, 539 A.2d 340, 345 (1988).
135. 511 Pa. 610, 515 A.2d 894 (1986). Justice McDermott wrote the opinion for the
majority, in which Justices Larsen, Flaherty, Hutchinson and Papadakos joined. Id. at 61011, 515 A.2d at 894-95. Justice Larsen also filed a separate and concurring opinion; Chief
Justice Nix and Justice Zappala noted their dissent. Id. at 616, 515 A.2d at 897.
136. 510 Pa. 537, 510 A.2d 1217 (1986). The majority opinion was authored by Justice
Larsen, and Justices Flaherty, Hutchinson and Papadakos joined him in the opinion. Id. at
539, 564, 510 A.2d at 1218, 1231. Chief Justice Nix and Justice Hutchinson filed separate
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In Sayko, the defendant was charged with indecent assault, indecent exposure and corrupting the morals of a minor. 1 37 The defendant pled guilty and received separate sentences on each charge,
8
13
with both sentences to run consecutively.

The issue considered by the supreme court in Sayko was under
what circumstances acts committed during a criminal transaction
are merged into a single crime for sentencing purposes.' 39 The
court looked at the nature of the offenses to see if there had been
more than one injury to the Commonwealth, that is, whether the
offenses charged were proscribed by separate statutes which sought
to prevent different interests or harms." 40 The Sayko court concluded that merger was not required because the offenses at issue
involved different fundamental interests of the Commonwealth."'
In Commonwealth v. Rhodes,"4 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court applied a different interests analysis in deciding whether to
invoke the merger doctrine. In that case, the court was asked to
decide, among other things, whether double jeopardy principles or
the merger doctrine barred a conviction and sentence for both rape
and statutory rape arising out of a single act of sexual intercourse." 4 The supreme court concluded that neither the double
jeopardy clause nor the merger doctrine prohibited such a conviction and sentence." The rationale for the supreme court's decision
concurring opinions. Id. at 565-66, 510 A.2d at 1231-32. Justice Zappala concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice McDermott. Id. at 566-67, 510 A.2d at 1231-32.
137. Sayko, 511 Pa. at 612, 515 A.2d at 895. The victim was a four year old child. Id.
at 611, 515 A.2d at 895.
138. Id. at 612, 515 A.2d at 895.
139. Id. at 613, 515 A.2d at 895.
140. Id. at 615-16, 515 A.2d at 896-97.
141. Id. at 616, 515 A.2d at 897. For example, the supreme court stated that the interest protected by the statute prohibiting indecent exposure was proscribing exhibitionism,
while indecent assault involves the victim's right to be free from offensive touching. Id. Both

of these interests were different from the Commonwealth's interest in protecting minors
from corrupting influences. Id.
142. 510 Pa. 537, 510 A.2d 1217 (1986).
143. Id. at 561, 510 A.2d at 1229. The defendant in Rhodes was convicted of numerous
sex offenses in the rape of an eight year old girl. Id. at 540-42, 510 A.2d at 1218-19. The
defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, indecent exposure, and corruption of minors. Id. The trial court imposed
sentences on the convictions for rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and corruption
of a minor, but suspended the sentence on the statutory rape conviction. Id.
144. Id. at 561, 510 A.2d at 1229. On appeal, the superior court in Rhodes found the
evidence to be insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for rape, and accordingly vacated the defendant's rape conviction and all of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Id.
at 542-43, 510 A.2d at 1219-20. The supreme court, however, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's rape conviction. Id. at 563, 510 A.2d at 1230.
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in Rhodes was predicated upon the different interests analysis uti1 5
lized in Commonwealth v. Sayko. "
The essence, then, of the lesser included offense doctrine is determining whether one of the following factors is present in a particular case: (1) whether each offense requires proof of some additional fact; or (2) whether the violated statutes seek to protect
different interests, that is, whether there is more than one injury to
the Commonwealth, as evidenced by the designation of separate
statutes for each offense. 146 If either factor is shown to exist, the
charged offenses will not be considered included for either merger
or double jeopardy purposes." 7
Finding no statutory basis for McCane's double jeopardy argument, the majority opinion finally considered whether a constitutional basis existed for McCane's double jeopardy claim under the
Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. 1 8 McCane contended that the double jeopardy clauses of the Pennsylvania and
United States Constitutions prevented his reprosecution for homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence.'"
In addition to the statutory prohibition on double jeopardy in
Pennsylvania," both the state and federal constitutions contain a
double jeopardy clause. 5 1 In 1969, the United States Supreme
Court first applied the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v.
Maryland. 52 Concluding that the double jeopardy prohibition of
the fifth amendment involves a fundamental right which was at
145. Id. at 562-63, 510 A.2d at 1230. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
146. Moszczynski, 343 Pa. at 106, 21 A.2d at 922; Sayko, 511 Pa. at 616, 515 A.2d at
897; Rhodes, 510 Pa. at 562, 510 A.2d at 1230.
147. See supra note 146.
148. McCane, 517 Pa. at 499, 539 A.2d at 345-46. See supra notes 11 and 12 for the
language of the constitutional provisions.
149. Brief for McCane at 11-12.
150. See supra notes 10, 110 and 111.
151. See supra notes 11 and 12.
152. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See also Belsky, supra note 110, at 804. Prior to the court's
decision in Benton, double jeopardy violations were governed by article I, section 10 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Belsky, supra note 110, at 804 n.80. However, Pennsylvania
courts applied the equivalent state constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy only
to capital offenses. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 344 Pa. Super. 108, 146, 496
A.2d 31, 51-52 (1985) (Spaeth, J., concurring). Consequently, the common law doctrine of
merger was created by the Pennsylvania courts to bar multiple punishments for the same
offense in situations where the accused was charged with noncapital crimes. Id. at 146, 496
A.2d at 51. Notwithstanding the constitutional evolution of double jeopardy in Pennsylvania, the issue of when and how double jeopardy should attach has been prescribed by statute in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code since 1973. See Belsky, supra note 110, at 804.
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least equal in importance to the right to trial by jury in criminal
cases, 153 the United States Supreme Court in Benton held that the
defendant's larceny conviction was to be scrutinized pursuant to
1 54
the double jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment.
In Benton, the accused was tried for burglary and larceny in a
Maryland state court. 5 5 The jury acquitted the defendant on the
larceny charge but found him guilty of burglary. 15 6 Thereafter, it
was discovered that the jurors had been selected under an invalid
provision of the Maryland Constitution, and the conviction was set
aside. 5 1 Interpreting the fifth amendment double jeopardy considerations, the Supreme Court in Benton ruled that where a subsequent trial is necessitated by a constitutionally invalid jury selection process, a criminal defendant cannot be forced to waive the
protection of double jeopardy on the acquitted charge. 5 8
The United States Supreme Court further interpreted the
double jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment in North Carolina v. Pearce. 59 The majority in McCane cited Pearce as authority for situations where the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy prohibits a second prosecution. 6 0 In Pearce, the United
States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause provides three distinct constitutional safeguards: protection against a
second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same
153. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794. The United States Supreme Court previously made the
right to a trial by jury in criminal cases applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
154. Benton, 395 U.S. at 796.
155. Id. at 785.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 785-86.
158. Id. at 796-97.
159. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In Pearce, two cases were consolidated for argument before
the Supreme Court: Appeal no. 413 and Appeal no. 418. Id. In each case, the criminal defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a prison term. Id. at 713-14. Each defendant
instituted a post-conviction proceeding in their respective state courts, resulting in a reversal of the convictions on constitutional grounds. Id. Both criminal defendants were retried
and convicted on the original charge. Id. In Appeal no. 413, the sentence imposed for the
second conviction, when added to the time already served by the criminal defendant, resulted in a longer aggregate sentence than the one imposed for the first conviction. Id. at
713. Similarly, in appeal no. 418, the criminal defendant received a longer sentence for the
second conviction and was not given any credit for the time already served on the first
conviction. Id. at 714. Thereafter, the criminal defendants brought separate habeas corpus
actions in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the sentence for the second conviction. Id. at 713-15.
160. McCane, 517 Pa. at 499, 539 A.2d at 345-46.
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offense.1"6 ' Because the double jeopardy violation in Pearce involved the third safeguard, imposition of multiple punishments for
the same offense, 6 2 the Supreme Court held that the criminal defendant must be given credit for time already served in imposing a
sentence for a new conviction for the same offense.' 6 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined a criminal defendant's constitutional rights under the double jeopardy clause in
Commonwealth v. James."" The majority in McCane cited James
for the proposition that a mistrial caused by a deadlocked jury
generally does not fall within the double jeopardy safeguards enumerated in Pearce, and thus, does not bar reprosecution.'6 5 In
James, the issue pondered by the court was whether a prosecutor
may appeal from a pretrial suppression order after a mistrial for
manifest necessity.166 According to the supreme court, manifest ne67
cessity arose because the jury was unable to agree on a verdict.
Thus, the court held that a mistrial for manifest necessity did not
161. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that "[the Fifth
Amendment] guarantee has been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections.
It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense." Id. (footnotes omitted).
162. Id. at 713.
163. Id. at 718-19.
164. 506 Pa. 526, 486 A.2d 376 (1985). In James, the criminal defendant pled guilty to
charges of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, terroristic threats, and
simple assault, but subsequently withdrew his guilty plea. Id. at 529, 486 A.2d at 377. Before
trial, the criminal defendant sought to suppress prior and in-court identification testimony
of the victim. Id. at 529, 486 A.2d at 377-78. The suppression court denied the defendant's
request as to the victim's prior identification testimony, but allowed the suppression of the
in- court identification testimony. Id. at 529, 486 A.2d at 378. The case proceeded to trial
and the jury was discharged after failing to agree upon a verdict. Id. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed an appeal with the superior court, requesting that the suppression order be
vacated to allow the in-court identification testimony and that a new trial be granted. Id.
The superior court reversed the order of the suppression court and found in favor of the
Commonwealth. Id. at 530, 486 A.2d at 378. On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
the criminal defendant argued that the Commonwealth should have taken a direct appeal of
the suppression order prior to trial and, by failing to do so, had waived any right to appeal
the suppression order after the trial. Id.
165. McCane, 517 Pa. at 499-500, 539 A.2d at 346. In McCane, the supreme court
applied the double jeopardy clauses of the Pennsylvania and the United States Constitutions. Id. at 500 & n.5, 539 A.2d at 346 & n.5.
166. James, 506 Pa. at 530, 486 A.2d at 378. Manifest necessity is defined in Black's
Law Dictionary as follows: "Doctrine. of 'manifest necessity' which will authorize granting of
mistrial in criminal case, and preclude defendant from successfully raising plea of former
jeopardy, contemplates a sudden and overwhelming emergency beyond control of court and

unforeseeable, and it does not mean expediency."
1979) (citation omitted).
167. James, 506 Pa. at 531, 486 A.2d at 378.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

868 (5th ed.
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bar reprosecution of the defendant on various sex offenses1 l 8
Certain public policy arguments, advocated by the United States
Supreme Court in Wade v. Hunter,"9 provide additional justification for finding no constitutional double jeopardy claim. The issue
in Wade was whether the double jeopardy provision of the fifth
amendment barred a second court-martial after a first court-martial had been commenced, but was later terminated because of a
pressing military tactical situation at the time and because of the
location of the witnesses.1 70 In holding that the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment did not bar the second court-martial, 171 the Supreme Court articulated two policy arguments to sup17 2
port its conclusion.
First, the Court suggested that a rule allowing a defendant to go
free whenever the trial fails to end in a final judgment would create havoc in the administration of justice in cases where there are
no double jeopardy violations.7 3 Second, the Supreme Court recognized that the law's purpose of protecting society from criminals
would be frustrated if the criminal defendant was set free every
time the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. 17 4 Weighing the various interests, the Supreme Court in Wade concluded
that in some circumstances society's interest in obtaining fair trials
168. Id. The criminal defendant was charged with involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, terroristic threats, and simple assault. Id. at 529, 486 A.2d at 377.
169. 336 U.S. 684 (1949). In Wade, an American soldier was arrested and charged with
the rape of two German women while stationed in Krov, Germany during world war II. Id.
at 685-86. Between the time of the soldier's arrest and the commencement of his courtmartial, his troop had advanced 22 miles further into Germany. Id. at 686. A general courtmartial was convened at the troop's new location, but was subsequently continued until a
later date so that the testimony of certain witnesses, who were unavailable at the time due
to the military division's tactical situation and their location, could be taken. Id. at 686-87.
170. Id. at 687-88.
171. Id. The Supreme Court in Wade held that:
Under the rule [in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579 (1824)], a trial can
be discontinued when particular circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing, and
when failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice. We see no reason why
the same broad test should not be applied in deciding whether court-martial action
runs counter to the Fifth Amendment's provision against double jeopardy. Measured
by the Perez rule to which we adhere, petitioner's second court-martial trial was not
the kind of double jeopardy within the intent of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 690.
172. Id. at 688-89.
173. Id. As an example, the Supreme Court explained that unforeseeable circumstances may arise during a trial, such as the inability of a jury to agree on a verdict, making
the completion of the trial impossible. Id. at 689. Moreover, if, in fact, the above contingency did occur, the consequence would be that those guilty of crimes would be set free,
thereby frustrating the purpose of the law to protect society from such individuals. Id.
174. Id.
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resulting in just judgments may outweigh an accused's right to
175
have his trial decided by a particular tribunal.
The final case, dispositive of the constitutional double jeopardy
claim in McCane, was Richardson v. United States.' In Richardson, the Supreme Court considered whether a mistrial precipitated
by the jury's failure to reach a verdict as to some, but not all,
counts of an indictment was an event that terminated the original
jeopardy.1 77 The defendant in Richardson was indicted on three
counts of federal drug offenses,'7 and the jury acquitted him on
one count; however, they were unable to reach a decision on the
remaining two counts.7 " When the trial court declared a mistrial
on the deadlocked counts and scheduled a retrial, the defendant
moved to bar reprosecution, contending that it would violate the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 8 0
In deciding Richardson, the Supreme Court refused to deviate
from established precedent that a retrial following a hung jury
does not violate the double jeopardy clause.' 8 ' The Supreme Court
175. Id. The Supreme Court in Wade expressly held that "a defendant's valued right
to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated
to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments." Id. at 689.
176. 468 U.S. 317 (1984). Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, in which
he was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and
O'Connor. Id. Justice Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
and was joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 326. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
at 332.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated that the majority overlooked the criminal defendant's real objection to the retrial, namely, that the prosecution failed to present evidence
which was constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, and therefore, retrial was
barred. Id. at 330. Justice Brennan would have remanded the case to the trial court for
consideration on the merits of the criminal defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id.
at 332. While the majority got beyond the jurisdictional issue in this case, Justice Stevens,
on the other hand, felt that the order denying the defendant's motion for a judgment of
acquittal on the basis that the evidence was legally insufficient was not appealable and, as a
matter of law, did not even present a colorable question of double jeopardy. Id.
177. Id. at 318.
178. Id. The federal drug offenses which the defendant was charged with committing
were two counts of distributing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
and one count of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846. Id.
179. Id. at 316-17. The criminal defendant was acquitted on one count of distributing
a controlled substance. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 324. The established precedent to which the Supreme Court adhered in
Richardson was articulated in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579 (1824); Logan
V. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978); and, Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). Richardson, 468
U.S. at 323-24.
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stated that this rule can be justified by acknowledging that the
protection of the double jeopardy clause applies only if there has
been some event, such as an acquittal or conviction, that terminates the original jeopardy.' 8 2 The Supreme Court went on to hold
that the failure of a jury to reach a verdict is not an event that
terminates jeopardy. 8 3
The key to the analysis of both the majority and concurrence in
McCane is their construction of section 109 of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code.'8 4 The justices interpreted section 109 to bar retrial
only where there are successive prosecutions. 85 Successive prosecution occurs where the subsequent prosecution is for a violation of
the same offense, is based on the same facts as the former prosecution, and the former prosecution results in an acquittal or conviction. ' The instance where all the charges are brought against a
defendant in one proceeding and a mistrial is declared on one of
the charges as a result of a hung jury, does not constitute a succes87
sive prosecution.'
After determining that reprosecution of McCane on the homicide by vehicle charge did not constitute a successive prosecution, 18 8 the court should have ended its analysis. As highlighted by
Chief Justice Nix in his concurrence, whether or not driving under
the influence and homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence are included offenses is irrelevant to the ultimate decision
of the court, since a prerequisite to invoking the statutory double
jeopardy protections of section 109 is a finding that a successive
prosecution exists. 89 Thus, Justice Larsen's discussion regarding
the lesser included offense doctrine in Pennsylvania 9 ° has little
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Richardson, 468 U.S. at 325.
Id.
See supra note 10 for the language of section 109.
See supra notes 43, 74 and 75 and accompanying text.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 274 Pa. Super. 167, 418 A.2d 346 (1980). See supra note

83.
187. See supra note 83. The conclusion that successive prosecutions did not exist in
McCane was emphasized in the supreme court's majority opinion.
In the instant case, retrial of [McCane] is not a successive prosecution, inasmuch as
the charges of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, and driving
under the influence were brought against [McCane] in the same proceeding. Reprosecution of [McCane] does not involve a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal or a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.
McCane, 517 Pa. at 500, 539 A.2d at 346 (citation omitted).
188. McCane, 517 Pa. at 500, 539 A.2d at 346.
189. Id. at 501-02, 539 A.2d at 346-47 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 498-99, 539 A.2d at 345.
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precedential value. 19 1 Moreover, there has been little consistency
among the courts in Pennsylvania regarding the application of the
lesser included offense doctrine. 9 2 It is doubtful, therefore,
whether the majority's opinion in McCane will have any impact on
the development of the law regarding lesser included offenses.
Of some significance is Chief Justice Nix's comment in his concurrence that he found section 109 to be applicable only where the
defendant is charged with the greater offense and the jury returns
a verdict on the lesser offense. 193 The clear implication of this
statement is that where both offenses are brought in the same proceeding, and there is a mistrial as to one of the charges, the double
jeopardy protections of section 109 are not applicable. Under this
interpretation, the lesser included offense doctrine must be considered where section 109 is found to be applicable.
Unfortunately, a clear pattern does not appear to be emerging
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with regard to the application of section 109 and Rule 1120(d) as a bar to reprosecution following a mistrial. The appellate courts in Pennsylvania seem to
have approached each case on an ad hoc basis,'9 4 the McCane decision being the most recent example. Perhaps some guidance could
be provided to the courts via legislative reform. In the meantime,
however, the courts will be forced to construe future cases involv191. To say that driving under the influence is not a lesser included offense of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence is really splitting a very fine hair. On the
one hand, Justice Larsen acknowledged that the statutory definition of homicide by vehicle
while driving under the influence requires a conviction of driving under the influence. Id. at
498, 539 A.2d at 345. Yet, the majority concludes that driving under the influence is not a
lesser included offense of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence based on:
(1) a comparison of common law crimes which do not require a conviction of the lesser
offense in order to obtain a conviction on the greater offense, and (2) the notion that the
offenses charged in McCane protected two different interests. Id. at 498-99, 539 A.2d at 345.
See supra notes 46-51, 134-45 and accompanying text. However, the proffered distinction
between the interests protected by driving under the influence and homicide by vehicle
while driving under the influence, the former being a victimless crime and the latter intending to protect specific victims, was contrived by the majority to justify the conclusion.
McCane, 517 Pa. at 498-99, 539 A.2d at 345. Indeed, a person convicted of driving under the
influence may have seriously injured innocent victims, perhaps resulting in paralysis for the
rest of their lives, yet the majority considers driving under the influence to be a victimless
crime. As stated earlier, the majority should have ended its analysis after determining that
the retrial of McCane did not constitute a successive prosecution.
192. See Comment, supra note 14, at 126-27.
193. McCane, 517 Pa. at 502, 539 A.2d at 347.
194. For example, the results in Vincent and Pounds turned on the superior court's
interpretation of the particular facts in each case, and the application of § 109 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code and the double jeopardy clause to the determined facts. See supra
notes 93-97, 101-08 and accompanying text.
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ing the applicability of Rule 1120(d) and section 109 of the Crimes
Code to bar retrial in light of the existing authority which, indeed,
has been scant.
Carol Starr

